No. 16IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
POWER VENTURES, INC. AND STEVEN VACHANI,
Petitioners,
v.
FACEBOOK, INC.,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
THOMAS LEE
Counsel of Record
A NDREW SCHWENK
HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP
One Battery Park Plaza
New York, New York 10004
(212) 837-6000
thomas.lee@hugheshubbard.com
Counsel for Petitioners
MARCH 9, 2017
271720

i

QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether an online company given consent by
users of an online social networking service to access
data shared or stored by the users on the service, but
is prohibited access by the service, “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization . . . and
thereby obtains information from [a] protected computer” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c) of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.

ii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Petitioner Power Ventures, Inc., states that it
has no parent corporation and that no publicly held
company owns 10% or more of its stock.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED .................................................................. i
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ................................................................. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................. vi
OPINIONS BELOW ............................................................................ 1
JURISDICTION .................................................................................... 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................... 3
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW ......................................................... 6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ............................. 8
I.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S
INTERPRETATION OF A FEDERAL
STATUTE IMPLICATING A QUESTION
OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE IS
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD
BE REVERSED. ...................................................................14

II.

THIS COURT SHOULD
ALTERNATIVELY GRANT AND
CONSOLIDATE WITH THE PENDING
PETITION IN NOSAL TO GIVE
GUIDANCE TO THE CIRCUITS IN
CONFLICT OVER THE PROPER
INTERPRETATION OF “WITHOUT

iv

AUTHORIZATION” IN 18 U.S.C. §
1030(A)(2)(C) ....................................................................23
III.

THIS CASE IS A FLAWLESS VEHICLE
FOR DECIDING THE QUESTION
PRESENTED, WHETHER BY
GRANTING THIS PETITION OR BY
CONSOLIDATION. .............................................................26

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................27

v

TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — ORDER AND AMENDED
OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, DATED
DECEMBER 9, 2016 ................................................................. 1a
APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO
DIVISION, FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2012 ......................... 25a
APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN JOSE
DIVISION, FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2013 ...................... 57a

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Butera & Andrews v. IBM Corp., 465 F.
Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2006) ................................. 25
Calence, LLC v. Dimension Data
Holdings, 2007 WL 1549495 (W.D.
Wash. 2007) .......................................................... 25
Doe v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med.l Ctr.,
2001 WL 873063 (D.N.H. 2001)........................... 25
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica,
Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (CA1 2001) ............................. 24
Exxon Mobil Corp v. Allapattah Servs.
Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) ................................ 13, 26
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273
(2002) .................................................................... 10
Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440
F.3d 418 (CA7 2006) ............................................ 24
Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
709 (2016) ............................................................. 23
Nosal v. United States, 844 F.3d 1024
(CA9 2016) .................................................... passim
Owasso Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1-011 v.
Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002)....................... 10, 19, 20

vii

SBM Site Servs., LLC. V. Garrett, 2012
WL 628619 (D. Colo. 2012) .................................. 25
United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263
(CA5 2010) ........................................................ 9, 24
United States v. Nosal, 676 F. 3d. 854
(CA9 2012) (en banc) ...................................... 11, 24
United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d
1258 (CA11 2010) ................................................. 24
United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119
(CA8 2011) ........................................................ 9, 24
United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508
(CA2 2015) ...................................................... 20, 24
WEC Carolina Energy Sols. v. Miller,
687 F.3d 199 (CA4 2012) ..................................... 24
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014) ................. 20
Constitutional Provisions
Fourth Amendment ..................................................... 4
Statutes and Rules
18 U.S.C. .................................................................... 14
18 U.S.C. § 1030 ................................................ passim
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ...................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 1291 .......................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 1367 .............................................. 1, 13, 26

viii

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)—a .............................................. 21
California Penal Code § 502........................................ 6
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 20.................................................... 26
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 20 and 23 ................................. 13, 26
20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) .............................................. 19, 20
Sup. Ct. R. 10(c) ................................................... 10, 14
Sup. Ct. R. 12(4) .................................................. 11, 25
Treatises and Periodical Materials
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Right to Data
Portability (Dec. 13, 2016) ............................... 4, 21
Aarti Shahani, The Man Who Stood Up
to Facebook, NPR (Oct. 13, 2016) ........................ 22
Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization”
in Computer Misuse Statutes” 78
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1586 (2003) .................................. 15
Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer
Trespass, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1143
(2016) .................................................................... 23
Orin Kerr, 9th Circuit: It’s a Federal
Crime to Visit a Website After Being
Told Not to Visit It, Washington Post
online (July 12, 2016)........................................... 23

ix

Mark Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91
Calif. L. Rev. 521, 523–26 (2003) ........................ 18
Josephine Wolff, The Hacking Law That
Can’t Hack It, Slate.com (Sept. 27,
2016) ..................................................................... 22

1

Power Ventures, Inc., and Steven Vachani respectfully petition this Court to grant a writ of certiorari to review the final decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in this action
on December 9, 2016.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Ninth Circuit panel’s opinion is reported
at 844 F.3d 1058 and is reproduced in Appendix A.
The opinion of the District Court granting summary
judgment is reported at 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025 and is
reproduced in Appendix B. The opinion of the District Court denying reconsideration is unreported
and is reproduced in Appendix C.
JURISDICTION
The panel (Graber, Wardlaw, Murguia) entered judgment on July 12, 2016. Petitioners timely
filed for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. Rehearing was denied on December 9, 2016; the panel
entered an amended final judgment the same day.
This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
This civil action is one arising under federal
law, over which the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1367 (supplemental California law claim). The Ninth Circuit
had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c) provides:
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“Whoever—intentionally accesses a computer
without authorization or exceeds authorized access
and thereby obtains—information from any protected
computer . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.”
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) defines key terms including:
As used in this section –
(1) the term “computer” means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data
storage facility or communications facility directly
related to or operating in conjunction with such
device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand
held calculator, or other similar device
(2) the term “protected computer” means a computer—
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution
or the United States Government, or, in the
case of a computer not exclusively for such use,
used by or for a financial institution or the
United States government and the conduct
constituting the offense affects that use by or
for the financial institution or the Government;
or
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a
computer located outside the United States
that is used in a manner that affects interstate
or foreign commerce or communication of the
United States
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) provides that:
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“Any person who suffers damage or loss by
reason of a violation of this section may maintain a
civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or equitable relief.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners are Power Ventures, Inc., and Steven Vachani, the CEO of Power Ventures, Inc. (collectively “Power”). From 2006 to 2011, Power operated an online communications, personal data management, and social networking aggregator hosted at
the website www.power.com. Power offered registered users the capacity to access multiple online social networks (e.g., LinkedIn, Twitter), messaging
services (e.g., Microsoft messenger—MSN), and
email accounts (e.g., Google mail) through a single,
integrated online interface consisting of a digital
dashboard and browser. This online interface also
featured popular add-in applications like a unified
address book and mailbox integrating all of a user’s
contacts, emails, social network messages, and instant messages in one place. The interface additionally enabled Power users to move files between different accounts with a click-and-drag function, like a
user moves folders on an Apple Computer desktop or
in Microsoft Windows. Power attracted more than
ten million dollars of investment as a startup from
noted Silicon Valley venture capital firms like
Draper Fisher Jurvetson (who also invested in Hotmail, Skype, and Tesla) and registered more than
twenty million users at its peak.
One key feature Power offered was the ability
to transfer document files, address book contacts, in-

4

stant messages, emails, and photos easily from one
online service to another. Because it is so timeconsuming for people to move countless bits of data
manually from one service provider to a competitor,
online companies like Power that facilitate moving a
user’s data when one provider’s terms of use are too
onerous are indispensable to lives lived increasingly
on line. The right of a user to readily move, copy,
and transmit his or her own personal data between
online service providers and storage devices is called
“data portability.” Data portability is a burgeoning
policy concern of our time, as underscored by a recent report issued by the European Commission’s Directorate General Justice and Consumers. (See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on
the Right to Data Portability (Dec. 13, 2016), available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/im
age/document/2016-51/wp242_en_40852.pdf).1
Respondent Facebook, Inc., is a publicly listed
Delaware corporation founded in 2004 and presently
headquartered in California. Facebook operates the
now-ubiquitous
social
networking
website
www.facebook.com. Facebook activates accounts for
its users (now numbering nearly two billion worldwide) who register with a unique username and
password and agree online to “terms of use.” Facebook users send “friend” requests to other friends
1

Data portability may be seen as the modern digital analogue of the
old freedom to dispose freely of one’s possessions, papers, and effects, protected from government intrusion by the Fourth Amendment.
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with Facebook accounts and post photos, observations, status and event updates, and links to interesting websites and articles for their Facebook
friends. Each Facebook user may set the audience to
which he or she wishes to post or share data like pictures and updates (e.g., friends only, the public at
large), and also the types of friends’ updates for
which they would like to receive notifications.
In November 2008, Power, which then had
over five million users, began offering any user who
had a Facebook account access to it through Power’s
online portal by entering his or her Facebook
username and password. When these were entered,
the Power user could access the Facebook website
through Power’s browser, similar to a computer user
clicking on his or her programs through Microsoft
Windows. (Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft Messenger,
Twitter, and Myspace were already accessible via the
Power portal in the same way.) Power users were
also invited, as part of a launch promotion, to invite
their own Facebook friends to enroll on Power via
“event” or “status” updates that caused Facebookgenerated emails to be sent to Facebook friends
whose notifications filters were set to allow them.
Facebook objected that Power’s access of its
service was unauthorized and sent Power a “cease
and desist” letter on December 1, 2008. Power responded that it had the Power users’ consent to access data they had stored on Facebook, including
their friends’ contact information. Facebook insisted,
however, that Power join “Facebook Connect,” its
program for third-party companies or websites to enroll for the right to access user profiles and data on
terms that Facebook dictated (e.g., without an easy
way to move data). Facebook also unsuccessfully at-
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tempted to block Power’s IP (internet protocol) address. Settlement negotiations took place during the
month of December 2008 but ultimately failed, and
Facebook sued. Facebook was the only online social
network provider to take legal action against Power.
Google, Twitter, Myspace, LinkedIn, Microsoft, and
others allowed their users who had Power accounts
to access and freely move their personal data among
their respective services via Power.
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On December 30, 2008, Facebook filed a civil
action against Petitioners in the federal district court
for the Northern District of California. Facebook’s
complaint, which was amended on January 13, 2009,
pled claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1986 (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), as
well as the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (“CANSPAM”) and California Penal Code Section 502,
among others. The statutory provision at issue in
this case, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), authorizes criminal and civil liability against “[w]hoever intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access and thereby obtains information from any protected computer.” The district
court granted summary judgment in Facebook’s favor on the CFAA, CAN-SPAM and California Penal
Code claims. App. 25a. It awarded statutory damages of $3,031,350 under CAN-SPAM, permanent injunctive relief, and held Vachani personally liable for
Power’s conduct. App. 109a.
Petitioners appealed. In a judgment originally
filed July 12, 2016, and amended on December 9,
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2016, the Ninth Circuit panel (Graber, Wardlaw,
Murguia) reversed the district court on CAN-SPAM
and invalidated the damages award (holding that the
relevant invitation messages were not misleading).
App. 13a, 23a. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling on Petitioner Vachani’s personal
liability. App. 22a. Respondent Facebook did not
seek rehearing on the CAN-SPAM reversal, and Petitioners do not challenge the panel’s affirmance of
personal liability before this Court.
The Ninth Circuit also reversed in part and affirmed in part on the CFAA and California Penal
Code claims, and, accordingly, remanded for consideration of appropriate remedies on those claims.
App. 23a. The court held that Petitioners had only
violated the CFAA (and state law) after Power received the cease-and-desist letter on December 1,
2008 and did not end its marketing campaign via Facebook users. App. 23a-24a. The court reasoned that
because the Power users with Facebook accounts had
consented to allow Power to access their Facebook
contacts, “it did not initially access Facebook’s computers ‘without authorization’ within the meaning of
the CFAA.” App. 17a. The court asserted, however,
that liability under the statute changed after Facebook sent the cease-and-desist letter, regardless of
the users’ consent that it had held to have constituted “authorization” under the statute before the letter. App. 17a. “The consent that Power had received
from Facebook users was not sufficient to grant continuing authorization to access Facebook’s computers
after Facebook’s express revocation of permission.”
App. 19a. The court accordingly held that “after receiving written notification from Facebook on December 1, 2008, Power accessed Facebook’s comput-
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ers ‘without authorization’ within the meaning of the
CFAA and is liable under that statute.” App. 20a.
Petitioners filed for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, which was denied on December 9,
2016; the panel issued an amended judgment the
same day. App. 1a. Hence this Petition, which seeks
this Court’s review of the question of CFAA interpretation only.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
Petitioners respectfully submit that the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) is
clearly erroneous and unprecedented. It is unreasonable to conclude as the lower court did that users’
consent for Power to access their Facebook data (i.e.,
friends’ photos and contact information) constitutes
“authorization” under the CFAA at one point but
does not at another. What led the court below to this
errant conclusion was the belief that Power was accessing “Facebook’s computers” when it reached out
to the Facebook friends of Power users with the users’ consent and invited them to join Power. But Facebook is not a “protected computer” as the term is
defined and used in the 1986 statute: rather, it is a
very modern online social network service provider
that encourages nearly two billion users worldwide
to join it and share personal data with friends and
family. In this context, the “authorization” the
CFAA refers to is plainly that of the data owners and
users. If Facebook wanted Power to stop accessing
this data, it could have asked the Power users who
owned the data to withdraw the consent they had
given to Power, or else cancel the users’ accounts.
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The Ninth Circuit panel’s interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) to ground a private cause of
action for an online social network like Facebook as
against another online company accessing user data
with the user’s consent is not only unreasonable, it is
unprecedented. Facebook, the party asserting a private right of action under the statute, has no authorship or ownership of the information accessed. Indeed, Facebook’s very business model is to entice
people—“users”—to share personal information
about themselves on its website. This is in stark
contrast to prior CFAA private claimants—typically
employers or former employers whose computers and
databases were hacked for sensitive information.
Facebook is not a bank whose account manager pilfered its client-account database to make fraudulent
charges, see United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263
(CA5 2010), or a government agency whose records
(including then President Barack Obama’s student
loan records) were surreptitiously searched by a government contractor, see United States v. Teague, 646
F.3d 1119 (CA8 2011). Rather, Facebook is a digital
scrapbook that enables users to curate their own
online personae for friends, family, or even the public
at large, and the data that Petitioners accessed were
these very artifacts of the users’ personal lives. Of
course, Facebook’s proprietary algorithms and confidential business records are its own information, and
Facebook could surely seek CFAA liability if Petitioners had accessed that information. But that is
not this case.
The court below’s unreasonable and unprecedented interpretation of the CFAA in this case has
immense implications not only in California—home
of Silicon Valley, the cradle of modern technological
innovation—but also across the nation. Hundreds of
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millions (billions, worldwide) of people use Facebook
and other social networking and “cloud” storage service providers like LinkedIn, Twitter, Google Docs,
Skype, Dropbox, and Microsoft OneDrive to connect
with friends and business associates; to store and
share cherished photos, stories, and documents; and
to post their observations on life’s big and small
questions. Facebook and other data controllers already have outsized influence over individual users
as gatekeepers. Judicial decisions like the one below
will aggrandize their power even more by handing
them veto power over online entrepreneurs like Petitioners who seek to enable data portability for users.
Additionally, the lower court’s interpretation
is acutely pernicious because 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(2)(C) also grounds criminal liability under
the CFAA of up to five years, ibid. § 1030(c)(2)(B). If
Congress today decides that Petitioners’ actions warrant such drastic criminal and civil liability, it can
enact a new statute; the Ninth Circuit’s creation of
such liability by judicial fiat in overreading a 1986
statute is not the right way.
This Court has previously granted certiorari
when a lower court erroneously interpreted a federal
statute on an important national issue, even in the
absence of a circuit split. See, e.g., Owasso Ind. Sch.
Dist. No. 1-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002); cf. Sup.
Ct. R. 10(c) (“an important question of federal law
that has not been, but should be, settled by this
Court”). Owasso is particularly instructive because
the Court granted and reversed the lower court’s interpretation of a federal statute that it later held in
the same Term did not even afford a private right of
action. See Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273
(2002).
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With special regard to this case, the overwhelming presence of technology companies in California and Washington makes it highly unlikely that
a split among the circuits on this precise issue will
ripen.2 Ninth Circuit precedents are often de facto
the law of the land on cutting-edge social media issues owing to the circuit’s hegemony over Silicon
Valley.
Alternatively, if this Court were not inclined
to grant this Petition as presenting a question of national importance on which it should rule, the Court
could hold the Petition over and consolidate it with
the soon-to-be pending petition in another Ninth Circuit case, Nosal v. United States (“Nosal II”), 844
F.3d 1024 (CA9 2016),3 for which an extension was
filed and granted by this Court until April 7, 2017
(No. 16A840). Cf. Sup. Ct. R. 12(4). Nosal II is a
criminal case involving a charge under 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(4), a liability provision of the CFAA with the
same “without authorization” language as §
1030(a)(2)(C). It applies to any person who “knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected
2

In addition to Facebook, many of the most popular online social
media providers like YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter, are based in
California. Some of the largest cloud service providers are also in the
Ninth Circuit’s geographic jurisdiction: Apple, Dropbox, and Google
Drive have headquarters in California, and Microsoft and Amazon are
based in Washington state.

3

An earlier case involved some of Nosal’s colleagues at Korn/Ferry
who downloaded confidential information from their employer in
violation of company policies before jumping ship with Nosal to
launch a competitive firm. See United States v. Nosal (“Nosal I”), 676
F. 3d. 854 (CA9 2012) (en banc).
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computer without authorization … and by means of
such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains
anything of value.” Ibid. § 1030(a)(4). Nosal, the defendant, accessed the confidential database of a former employer (the executive recruitment firm
Korn/Ferry) by using the password of his former executive assistant who stayed on at Korn/Ferry at his
request. The jury convicted Nosal of conspiracy to
violate the “without authorization” provision of the
CFAA under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
Nosal II and this case present the same issue
of whether a third party (here, Petitioners; there,
Nosal) who is denied authorization to access data
(here, friends’ contact information on Facebook;
there, Korn/Ferry’s confidential database) may do so
with the consent of an authorized user (here, Power
users with Facebook accounts; there, Nosal’s exexecutive assistant). As the dissenting judge pointed
out, because Nosal II involved a person (the assistant) who had authorization as a continuing
Korn/Ferry employee to access its database but not
for the “use” of enabling Nosal’s conspiracy, it could
be framed as implicating a 5-3 split among the circuits over whether “without authorization or exceeds
authorized access” in the CFAA covers an impermissible use by an authorized person. See Nosal II, 844
F.3d. at 1048, 1048-49 (Reinhardt, dissenting).
Of course, there are also important differences
between the Petitioners’ novel case involving an
online social network and Nosal II, which is a traditional case involving access to an employer’s or former employer’s computers or database. But in light
of the similarities, the Court could hold over this Petition, grant the two petitions together and consolidate for argument, and issue a decision that will be
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highly instructive to lower courts by distinguishing
between the two factual contexts as it deems appropriate. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp v. Allapattah
Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (simultaneously disposing of petitions from CA1 and CA11 regarding the
application of the supplemental jurisdiction statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), to joinder of plaintiffs in diversity suits under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 20 and 23, respectively).
In sum, this Court should grant certiorari in
this case. The lower court’s interpretation of the
CFAA to extend liability to Petitioners as against a
social networking website like Facebook is a question
of national importance and is clearly erroneous and
unprecedented. If uncorrected, the lower court’s ruling will affect hundreds of millions of American (and
a couple billion non-American) users of Facebook and
other social network and cloud providers. Alternatively, this Court could hold over this petition and
consolidate with the petition in Nosal II, which implicates a deep split regarding the scope of what
“without authorization” means in the CFAA. Regardless of what this Court chooses to do, this case
presents a flawless vehicle to decide the Question
Presented.4

4

Indeed, this case may arguably be a better vehicle than Nosal II because the defendant in that criminal case was also convicted of two
counts of trade secret theft in violation of the Economic Espionage
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832 (a). See Nosal II, 844 F.3d., at 1041.
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I.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF A
FEDERAL STATUTE IMPLICATING A QUESTION
OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE IS CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.

The Ninth Circuit’s unreasonable and unprecedented interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) of
the CFAA to apply to an online social network service provider seeking to bar another online company
acting with users’ consent from accessing user data
is clearly erroneous and risks mischief on hundreds
of millions of internet users. Rule 10(c) of this Court
explicitly provides that a lower court’s decision of an
“important question of federal law that has not been,
but should be, settled by this Court” is a factor to be
considered in granting certiorari. And, as elaborated
below, this Court sometimes acts to correct a clearly
erroneous interpretation of an important statute by a
lower court, even in the absence of a circuit split, to
prevent ripple effects or dire national consequences.
The CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, was initially enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(1984). The 1984 statute was substantially revised
in 1986, with minor subsequent revisions. The
CFAA has both criminal and civil liability provisions,
with criminal sentences ranging from twenty years,
e.g.,18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(1)(B), to one year, e.g., ibid. §
1030(c)(2). The statute’s provision for a private right
of action states that: “Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section
may maintain a civil action against the violator to
obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief
or equitable relief.” Ibid. § 1030(g). Facebook
brought its CFAA claim against Petitioners pursuant
to this provision.
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The specific provision of the CFAA that Facebook alleged Petitioners had violated was 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(2)(C),
which
provides:
“Whoever—
intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access and thereby obtains—information from any protected computer . . .
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this
section.”5
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) defines “computer” to
include not only “data processing devices” but also
“any data storage facility or communications facility
directly related to or operating in conjunction with
such device.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) then defines a
“protected computer” to mean a “computer”:
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or
the United States Government, or, in the case of a
computer not exclusively for such use, used by or
for a financial institution or the United States government and the conduct constituting the offense
affects that use by or for the financial institution or
the Government; or
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in
a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States

5

See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes” 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1586
(2003).
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A violation of this provision can result in a
criminal sentence of up to five years.
Ibid.
§ 1030(c)(2)(B).
Thus, Facebook’s CFAA claim, which the
Ninth Circuit adopted, was that Petitioners had accessed its website and servers—a “protected computer” under CFAA—and that it did so “without authorization” since Facebook had explicitly told them to
desist. On Facebook’s view, the authorization of the
individual users whose Facebook data Petitioners accessed was irrelevant after Facebook had instructed
Petitioners to stop: their authorization was no longer
the “authorization” the CFAA required. Specifically,
the court reasoned:
Because Power had at least arguable permission to access Facebook’s computers [from
Power users with Facebook accounts], it did
not initially access Facebook’s computers
‘without authorization’ within the meaning of
the CFAA. But Facebook expressly rescinded
that permission when Facebook issued its
written cease and desist letter to Power on December 1, 2008.
App. 17a.
The lower court’s holding is unprecedented
and unreasonable. Whatever confusion there was
about what constituted “without authorization”
among the circuits, see infra Part II, no court had
held until now that the consent of the individual persons who generated, owned, stored, or shared the
relevant data or information was irrelevant to the
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“authorization” the statute required.6 To be sure, if
the controller or custodian of the data were a bank or
a U.S. government agency, then the argument might
seem at least superficially plausible. But in this
case, Facebook is an online social network provider,
with which people voluntarily share personal data
and information precisely to disseminate it, not to
lock it away in a vault or to submit sensitive information to apply for a government job or benefits.
Nor is Facebook claiming that its own proprietary
algorithms and business records were the information that Petitioners mined. At the very least, the
users’ authorization has to matter for something:
the Ninth Circuit’s decision renders it entirely irrelevant after Facebook denied access to Petitioners
and gives Facebook the unitary veto power that it
wanted with respect to its competitors like Power.
The obvious truth is that the court below was
wrong to conclude the statute is meant to afford a
private right of action for an online company with
consent from its users to access their personal information shared with another online social networking
service when the other service tells the company to
stop.7 In such a case, the company is not “intention6

Facebook did not argue below that Petitioners exceeded the users’
authorization of access to their data. In other words, there is no dispute that Petitioners acted within the consent provided by users with
respect to the users’ Facebook accounts.
7

The court below analogized Petitioners’ conduct to a person given
permission to access jewelry in a friend’s safe deposit box who walks
into the bank with a shotgun to whom the bank refuses entry. See
App. 19a. The analogy is inapt and misleading because Facebook’s
mission is not to secure the users’ “property” (e.g., photos, friends’
Footnote continued

18

ally access[ing] a computer without authorization or
exceed[ing] authorized access” and “thereby obtain[ing] information—from any protected computer”
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). It is unsurprising that no other circuit court has reached this
conclusion, not only because it is an unreasonable
construction of the statutory text, but also because
this type of issue about the CFAA is likely to rise
most commonly if not exclusively in California and
portions of the West Coast within the Ninth Circuit’s
jurisdiction, where almost all U.S. social network
and cloud computing service providers are headquartered.
Furthermore, although the lower court repeatedly referred to Petitioner’s access to “Facebook’s
computers,” e.g., App. 5a, 14a, it is debatable whether Facebook and its servers are a “protected computer” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). The
Footnote continued from previous page
contact information) in an online vault, but rather to share it with
friends and family and sometimes the public at large. Furthermore,
Power did not wield a figurative gun: its user-authorized entry into
users’ Facebook data was not even arguably coercive or dangerous,
as evidenced by the fact that every other online service in Facebook’s
position (like Google and Microsoft) permitted it. As Judge Wardlaw
noted during the oral argument below, physical property analogies
are often unhelpful in the online context. Facebook Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., et. al, Oral Arg., 40:48-41:22, No. 13-17102 (CA9 Dec. 9,
2015),
available
at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4QUai3OmkdA; see also Mark
Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 521, 523–26 (2003)
(“[E]ven a moment’s reflection will reveal that the analogy between
the Internet and a physical place is not particularly strong.”).
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statute defines a “protected computer” as a computer
or “data storage facility or communications facility”
that performs a mission perceived as essential to
protect against fraud in the 1980s, such as a computer “exclusively for the use of a financial institution or
the United States Government,” see ibid. §§
1030(e)(1), 1030(e)(2)(A).
True, 18 U.S.C.
§1030(e)(2)(B)’s catchall reference to a computer
“used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce
or communication” is broadly worded. But a social
networking website that users access, primarily to
stay in touch with friends and family, is far beyond
the government mainframes, bank electronic accounts, and electronic trading exchanges that Congress and President Ronald Reagan envisioned when
they passed the CFAA. This kind of vital regulation
of the new economy should be ratified by a new Congress, not a Congress three decades ago that could
not have even imagined a Facebook or a Google.
The Court has previously granted certiorari to
correct a clear error in interpreting a federal statute
likely to have broad repercussions if uncorrected,
even in the absence of a circuit split. For example, in
Owasso Independent School District No. 1-011 v.
Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, there was no conflict among the
circuits regarding the relevant question of statutory
interpretation. Nevertheless, the Court unanimously
reversed the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the
Federal Educational Records and Privacy Act of 1974
(“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g), to reach student-onstudent peer grading and reporting of test scores.
The Court reasoned that this interpretation “would
impose substantial burdens on teachers across the
country.” Ibid. at 435. “Indeed, the logical consequences of respondent’s view are all but unbounded.”
Ibid.
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Like the Tenth Circuit’s erroneous decision in
Owasso implicating educational privacy records, the
Ninth Circuit’s clearly erroneous decision regarding
data privacy promises to have substantial adverse
ripple effects if not corrected. Its interpretation
“would impose substantial burdens,” not on teachers,
but rather on internet users “across the country”
locked into their current social network service or
cloud storage providers.
Furthermore, internet
startups like Petitioners would be constrained from
offering services like data aggregation and relocation
to enhance user freedom and online diversity. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s error here is even more
egregious because a violation of CFAA, unlike
FERPA, can ground criminal liability of up to five
years in this case, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B), as well
as private liability. As such, there are additional
rule of lenity concerns for reversing the lower court’s
decision. Cf. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508
(CA2 2015) (applying the rule of lenity to construe
“authorized access” in CFAA narrowly).
Similarly, in White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697
(2014), the Court granted certiorari and reversed a
judgment from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirming the grant of a habeas petition
because the Court determined the lower court had
misinterpreted the federal habeas statute. Both the
federal district and appellate courts held that the
state court’s refusal to issue a “no adverse inference
from failure to testify” instruction to a jury in a
death penalty sentencing hearing violated the defendant’s due process rights. Ibid. at 1701. This
Court explained that the federal habeas statute’s
“unreasonable application” language is only met
when the state court’s decision is “objectively unreasonable,” ibid. at 1702, which the Court held was not
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the case. Although the Sixth Circuit’s application of
the statute did not create a circuit split, this Court
nonetheless reversed because the circuit “disregarded the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)—a provision
of law that some federal judges find too confining,
but that all federal judges must obey.” Ibid at 1701.
The Ninth Circuit’s erroneous decision has
immense implications for users of online social media
and cloud storage. As users create more online data,
data portability among different service providers
seeking to keep existing users locked in becomes a
growing concern. New European Commission guidelines dictate that users must have “the right to
transmit personal data from one data controller to
another data controller without hindrance.” (See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines
on the Right to Data Portability, at 4 (Dec. 13, 2016)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/im
age/document/2016-51/wp242_en_40852.pdf).
This
ensures that users “can obtain and reuse, but also []
transmit the data they have provided to another service provider.” Ibid. The Ninth Circuit has created
civil and criminal liability for a company seeking to
assist users—with their consent—fully to use, enjoy,
and move their own data online as they choose.
By way of an example, consider a person who
pays a monthly subscription to a hypothetical company called PhotoBook, an online cloud storage service, to organize and access family photos from any
computer. Over years of creating and saving photos,
the user amasses thousands of photos stored in PhotoBook. Then, because of financial need or practical
considerations, the user wishes to transfer those
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photos to another service or to a personal computer.
The user may seek to hire a company such as Power—a digital mover—to transfer the photos because
of a lack of time or technological knowhow. But under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the CFAA,
PhotoBook may unilaterally deny the moving service
access to the user’s photos, even with the user’s explicit consent. PhotoBook not only gains a power to
lock-in its users (subject to increasingly onerous
terms), it stifles innovation in the internet economy,
all based on a clever but erroneous spin on a 1986
statute.
The importance of the Question Presented is
underscored by the attention paid to it. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), a prominent internet rights non-profit organization, filed two amicus briefs at different stages of the district court proceedings. In the Ninth Circuit, the EFF again filed
two amicus briefs. The latter of which, joined by the
national American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)
and the ACLU of Northern California, explained that
the Ninth Circuit’s decision risks creating liability
for individual internet users, researchers, and journalists. See Amicus Brief of EFF et al., No. 1317154, Dkt. 89 (CA9 Aug. 19, 2016), available at
https://www.eff.org/document/facebook-v-powerventures-eff-aclu-amicus-brief. The case and the Petitioners have been the subject of articles in major
news organs like NPR, (Aarti Shahani, The Man
Who Stood Up to Facebook, NPR (Oct. 13, 2016)
available at https://goo.gl/UAXhVk), Slate, (Josephine Wolff, The Hacking Law That Can’t Hack It,
Slate.com
(Sept.
27,
2016),
available
at
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https://goo.gl/iXnxey), and by Professor Orin Kerr,8
in the Washington Post online, (Orin Kerr, 9th Circuit: It’s a Federal Crime to Visit a Website After Being Told Not to Visit It, Washington Post online (July
12, 2016) available at https://goo.gl/rdc2Cu).
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD ALTERNATIVELY GRANT
AND CONSOLIDATE WITH THE PENDING
PETITION IN NOSAL TO GIVE GUIDANCE TO THE
CIRCUITS IN CONFLICT OVER THE PROPER
INTERPRETATION OF “WITHOUT
AUTHORIZATION” IN 18 U.S.C. § 1030(A)(2)(C)

The meaning of the words “without authorization or exceeds authorized access” in 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(2)(C) has sparked conflict among the lower
courts and is ripe for guidance from this Court.9 18
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) defines “exceed authorized access” to mean “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser [sic] is not
entitled so to obtain or alter.”
8

Professor Kerr, a national expert on computer crime law issues, was
joint counsel for Petitioners at the court below. See also Orin S. Kerr,
Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1143 (2016).

9

Last term, in Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709 (2016), this
Court unanimously held that an erroneous jury instruction on 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C)—that the defendant had to have acted “without authorization and exceed authorized access”—did not offend due
process, since it presented a tougher standard for conviction than the
correct reading of the statute with a disjunctive “or”. That decision,
accordingly, did not address circuit conflict about the meaning of
“without authorization” and “exceeded authorized access.”
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Because most CFAA cases arise in the context
of an employee or ex-employee accessing an employer’s computers or database, this definition would appear to foreclose civil and criminal liability in cases
where the employee was entitled to access but did so
for an unauthorized use. Three circuits have hewed
to this narrow definition. See United States v. Valle,
807 F.3d 508 (CA2 2015) (New York City policeman
not criminally liable for accessing criminal database
for personal reasons); WEC Carolina Energy Sols. v.
Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (CA4 2012); United States v.
Nosal (“Nosal I”), 676 F.3d 854 (CA9 2012).
On the other hand, five circuits have held that
employees or ex-employees who access computers to
obtain data they have a right to access, but do so for
an improper use or do so in violation of the employer’s policies, violate the CFAA. See EF Cultural
Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (CA1
2001) (former employee violated CFAA by using
“scraper” technology to get price data from a former
employer’s public website); United States v. John,
597 F.3d 263 (CA5 2010); Int’l Airport Centers, LLC
v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (CA7 2006); United States v.
Teague, 646 F.3d 1119 (CA8 2011); United States v.
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (CA11 2010). This Court
has not resolved this 5-3 circuit split between the
narrow “no liability for improper use” view and broad
“liability for improper use” views of the CFAA.
As described in detail above, the soon-to-be
pending petition for certiorari in Nosal II can be
framed as implicating this deep split, and, also, the
same issue as this case when framed at a higher level of abstraction. This could be done, for example, by
tweaking the Question Presented by this Petition to
read: “Whether a third party given consent by a user
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to access data on a ‘protected computer’ acts ‘without
authorization’ in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) of
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.”
Without speaking to the merits of Nosal II, Petitioners assert that this case independently warrants grant of certiorari because it presents a unique
question of national importance about the applicability of the CFAA to online social media companies.
This question has ramifications for hundreds of millions, if not billions, of internet users and burgeoning
concerns about data portability. In this respect, it
differs from the traditional CFAA cases in the lower
courts involving access to an employer’s or former
employer’s computers or database, which are usually
fact-bound to the specifics of each case of less universal concern.
But if this Court were not inclined to grant
this Petition, then Petitioners respectfully request
that it hold the Petition over and consolidate it with
the soon-to-be pending petition in Nosal II, for which
an extension was filed and granted by this Court until April 7, 2017. See Nosal v. U.S., No. 16A840 (Feb.
24, 2017); Cf. Sup. Ct. R. 12(4). On prior occasions,
this Court has done so, to the profit and guidance of
lower courts conflicted in similar but not identical
applications of an enigmatic statute.10 For instance,
10

In fact, there is yet another burgeoning split among the lower
courts regarding 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). One federal district court
has held that the new employer of a person who hacks into the computer of a former employer may also be liable under the CFAA. See
SBM Site Servs., LLC. V. Garrett, 2012 WL 628619 (D. Colo. 2012).
Three district courts have held that a new employer under these circumstances cannot be vicariously liable. See Calence, LLC v. DimenFootnote continued
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in Exxon Mobil Corp v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545
U.S. 546 (2005), this Court issued a single opinion
construing the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367, with respect to two different factual
contexts involving the statute’s application to complete diversity and amount-in-controversy requirements for class actions (Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23) and
simple joinder of plaintiffs (Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 20). The
Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil supplied welcome
repose to lower courts and lawyers mired for decades
in confusion about the statute’s meaning. So, too, in
the present case, any guidance from this Court on
the application of the CFAA’s “without authorization” language to different factual contexts such as in
this case and Nosal II would be illuminating and
welcome.
III. THIS CASE IS A FLAWLESS VEHICLE FOR
DECIDING THE QUESTION PRESENTED,
WHETHER BY GRANTING THIS PETITION OR BY
CONSOLIDATION.
The facts relevant to this petition as articulated by the court below are undisputed and sharply
frame the crucial question of statutory interpretation
raised. Accordingly, the Court will be able to reach
and decide the Question Presented without the risk
Footnote continued from previous page
sion Data Holdings, 2007 WL 1549495 (W.D. Wash. 2007); Butera &
Andrews v. IBM Corp., 465 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2006); Doe v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med.l Ctr., 2001 WL 873063 (D.N.H. 2001).
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of an intervening disputed fact or procedural default.
The challenged part of the decision below rests entirely on the Ninth Circuit’s errant interpretation of
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). The issue presented here
was fully briefed and considered by the Court of Appeals in a reasoned opinion, and so this Court has
the benefit of the Court of Appeals’ views on the subject. The Question Presented by this Petition has
generated national attention and implicates the future of data privacy and portability. It is ripe for a
decision by this Court. Given that the lower court’s
decision on a question of national importance was
clearly erroneous and unprecedented, this Court
could summarily grant, reverse, and remand. But if
the Court is disinclined to do so, Petitioners stand
ready to brief and argue the merits of the case before
the Court at its pleasure.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
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